

# *Schleiermacher Among the Theorists of Language and Interpretation*

BY THE NICETIES of exact chronology, Friedrich Schleiermacher validated his standing as an eighteenth-century thinker with a year to spare. To insist on the point, however, is already to have violated some finer hermeneutic continuity between Schleiermacher's papers and addresses on understanding and interpreting texts and both his account of religion (which came in under the century) and his assessment of his own hermeneutic precursors and contemporaries (Ast and Wolf and Ernesti, chiefly). Schleiermacher's "Aphorisms," dated from 1805 and 1809-10, is, from the first entry, addressed to perceived limitations in Ernesti's conception of hermeneutics; and the so-called "Compendium of 1819" is obviously motivated by the need to provide a systematic hermeneutics that would overcome Ast and Wolf's failure to have done so, in spite of their own compendious grasp of eighteenth-century accounts.<sup>1</sup> The essential continuities are of course deeper. For Schleiermacher's insistence on a comprehensive hermeneutical method, which would not privilege the Scriptures in cognitive or methodological terms (though it would have to concede the normative privilege of their message) is already entirely explicit in the first edition (1761) of Ernesti's manual for interpreting the New Testament. It is in fact regularly remarked by later historians of hermeneutics reviewing just this transitional period in which Schleiermacher plays such a decisive role, that Ernesti's (and Schleiermacher's) precept about method had already been memorably fixed a full century before in Spinoza's *Tractatus*, in terms of the powers of natural reason—where it is clearly meant to shape an already ancient

interpretive tradition.

Now, it would ordinarily be (and would ordinarily be rightly taken to be) a polite dismissal of an author's intellectual standing, to feature particularly—and then to applaud—his having grasped the great difficulty of putting in order a distinct discipline he is supposed to have had a principal hand in shaping and mastering. But that is Schleiermacher's fate—and, also, the sign of his genuine, even remarkable, intelligence. For hermeneutics is *not* a well-established, a well-ordered, a well-understood, even a well-received science even in our own enlightened day. The puzzle of hermeneutics has only deepened since its relatively explicit modern beginnings in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and the result is that the discussion of the discipline cannot but be contemporaneous, in the double sense that we cannot afford to ignore the conceptual complexities Schleiermacher (and others) had already refused to ignore (if ever hermeneutics is to be brought into systematic order) and that the appreciation of the hermeneutic task is itself a hermeneutic task. To make a sly point of it: disagreements about Schleiermacher's contribution are bound to collect instances of contending conceptions of what the human understanding of human language and life really amounts to and of what measure of rigor we may or may not reasonably assign the interpretation of our own and one another's texts, utterances, and acts. By the natural drift of such reflection, historical recovery and philosophical theorizing are happily made one.

We would not be distorting Schleiermacher's project if we construed it in Kantian terms: How is it possible to understand any text or utterance or significant human act? We would misunderstand Schleiermacher, however, if we gave a Kantian answer to the question. For

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Schleiermacher expressly criticizes Kant's peculiarly abstract Enlightenment conception of moral reason and moral seriousness, along lines that clearly converge with his own romantic idealist conception of human agency, of the unique constellation of individual life Schleiermacher calls "feeling." This way of focusing Schleiermacher's contribution is surely central to Wilhelm Dilthey's use of that material in constructing his own more distinctly Kantian critique of historical understanding—his version of the hermeneutic nature of the *Geisteswissenschaften*, for which Dilthey is rightly remembered, however it may have skewed our picture of Schleiermacher in the process; but it also manages to catch the peculiar mixture of rational confidence Schleiermacher draws from seventeenth and eighteenth-century sources, and his own refined anti-Kantian idealism that senses the dawning significance of history without plunging us too deeply or at once in the extreme directions Schlegel and Hegel afford (still within the internal of Schleiermacher's work)—that is, regarding the universal voice of genius and the totalized *telos* of historical time. There's the nerve of Schleiermacher's discipline: for Schleiermacher has above all an admirably balanced mind.

Biblical hermeneutics, from Luther to the transition from the eighteenth to the nineteenth century, centers on the unending and hopeless quarrel between the opposing dogmas of insisting on the correct interpretation of Scripture through a dogmatically specified tradition (in which Scripture is effectively received) and of insisting on the recovery of the literal sense of Scripture solely on the basis of the alleged text itself. That contest, largely segregating Roman Catholic and Lutheran conviction, is equally committed on both sides to a cognitive privilege unique to Biblical issues and equally unwilling, there, to characterize adequate worldly conditions facilitating the competence of actual human communities to interpret the sacred texts. It is generally acknowledged to be Schleiermacher's distinction to have been the first to have assembled in one methodological plan the promising themes of his eighteenth-century predecessors in terms: (i) of a universally applicable art and science of understanding or interpretation, that is, one rejecting (except derivatively) specialized or independent herme-

neutic practices; (ii) of a metatheory of that would-be discipline; that is, of a theory addressed to the conditions of human understanding, not content merely with deciding in a piecemeal or intermittent way the meaning of difficult or contested texts; (iii) of the need to integrate coherently the relevant roles of universal human nature and thought, historically diverse languages and cultures, and individual career, genius, or feeling; that is, in effect, an eclectic union of Enlightenment, idealist, romantic, and historicist elements; (iv) of the indissoluble connection between understanding another, self-understanding, and the serious pursuit of life; that is, of a deeper union of theory and practice than Kant attained, in terms of the requirements and resources of human life itself, and of an appreciation of the symbiosis of individual and societal life within an historically evolving culture; and (v) of the unending, self-corrective, approximative, partially intuitive, somewhat inexact, hardly apodictic, but altogether natural and sensible way in which understanding is achieved, that is, setting the mark of what they (humans) should understand as understanding themselves, *in* understanding themselves, and all the while tolerating some incompleteness, imprecision, divergence, provisionality and the like. This vision alone is sufficient to set Schleiermacher apart as a remarkably balanced mind—not only of his own century but (if we may so speak) in ours, where we labor to appreciate his achievement, where the cultivation of hermeneutics has been a little like the cultivation of kudzu vine.

Schleiermacher's achievement, stated in the homeliest way, centers on the fact that he was convinced (and pursued the conviction) that man must be capable of understanding his fellow (as he understands himself) and that this ability (which may well lend itself to discipline, improvement, system, and variable talent and skill) must be the common, accessible property of humanity. Against the dominant philological tradition spanning his own period, Schleiermacher construes hermeneutics as not at all restricted to written texts or ancient texts or difficult texts or foreign texts. He insists that hermeneutic skills are ubiquitously needed in understanding face-to-face discourse. (They may, however, be quite spontaneously invoked and adequate to their task.) "Text," of course,

is a peculiarly loaded term these days—as the merest mention of Gadamer, Derrida, Barthes, de Man, Hartman, Bloom, Lacan, Kristeva, Fish, and Riffaterre cannot fail to warn us. But if one favors the term, then anachronistically, it was Schleiermacher's distinction to treat the whole of human life—written utterance, oral exchange, practiced behavior, social acts—as hermeneutically freighted texts, familiar and alien, conventional and idiosyncratic, communal and personal, foreign and local, ancient and contemporary, insofar as they manifest themselves in languages.

The point is already pressed in the "Aphorisms": "Language [says Schleiermacher] is the only presupposition in hermeneutics, and everything that is to be found, including the other objective and subjective presuppositions, must be discovered in language."<sup>2</sup> Dilthey seems to have been aware of the "Aphorisms" in his early, influential interpretation of Schleiermacher as a distinctly romantic hermeneut; but he was apparently unable or unwilling to weigh this emphasis sufficiently (so the argument goes) because he was unfamiliar with the so-called "First Draft of 1809-10." Dilthey's judgment, colored by his grasp of Schleiermacher's late development, maintains that "the aphorisms present to us . . . the impelling thought from which his hermeneutics developed: the essence of interpretation is the reconstruction of the work as a living act of the author."<sup>3</sup> This is the prevailing picture, of course. Ironically, it is also Gadamer's picture of Schleiermacher, much influenced by Dilthey (whom he rejects), in spite of the fact that Gadamer (rather like the Schleiermacher of the "Aphorisms") characteristically insists—via Humboldt, perhaps chiefly—that language is the medium of hermeneutic experience and the essential reason man has a "world" at all.<sup>4</sup>

In any case, in speaking in a way fairly collected in the five themes tallied, Schleiermacher instantly bridges the space between the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth and our own day, by focussing most economically the drive for a universally applicable method (the presumption of science), the admission of the *sui generis* nature of human understanding (the threatening bifurcation of the sciences), against subsuming the historical and personal circumstances of understanding under any explicitly universal, antecedently

formulated rules of discipline (accommodation of the contingencies of historicism and individual variation), acknowledgement that man cannot count on divine instruction here (the competence of natural reason and the absence of appeal to cognitive privilege within the range of human competence), and the sense of the open, improvisational possibilities of living cultures (the dawning of a modern, though admittedly still primitive, grasp of the historical nature of life itself).

Because Heidegger and Gadamer demote the epistemological question of hermeneutics to the ontological question of man's nature (what Heidegger calls *Dasein*), nearly all recent commentators on Schleiermacher noticeably strain—may we say, hermeneutically?—the message of Schleiermacher's achievement, which is clearly scattered among a variety of handwritten fragments. The theme in Gadamer, for instance, is the defect of a romantic conception of method, that is, one favoring authorial intent; also, the defect of exaggerating (here, more pertinent surely against Emilio Betti and, more recently, against E. D. Hirsch—though not even there with full justice) the positivist-like possibilities of a hermeneutic *method*. In others, in Dilthey, in Betti, in Hirsch, and in a way more interestingly in Paul Ricoeur (because Ricoeur is so favorably influenced by Husserl and the Heideggerian turn and so respectful of Gadamer), the pursuit or recovery of method is not permitted to dissolve (as it surely tends to in Gadamer), all the while each considers the putative profundity of Schleiermacher's grasp of human nature.

In Heinz Kimmerle's introduction to his edition of the hermeneutic papers, therefore, still responding to the unspent force of the Heideggerian and Gadamerian turn, one finds Kimmerle featuring the putatively neglected topic of the equivalence of thought and language.<sup>5</sup> The issue is equally pertinent to the question of method and the question of ontology. It is Kimmerle's notion that Schleiermacher equated thought and language in his early hermeneutic views and even as late as 1813—"thought and expression [or language] are essentially and internally entirely the same" (says Schleiermacher);<sup>6</sup> but that, in his later work, notably in the "Academy Addresses of 1829," Schleiermacher begins to explore the

“process of movement from the internality of thought to language.” Kimmerle’s point is that, for Schleiermacher, there is an ineliminable “modification of the general language” of a given community, that is due to the “‘individual nature’” of the speaker. Hermeneutics is not, in the later work, centered on understanding a speaker’s thought from any individual variation within the total range of a given language; it is said to be centered rather on understanding the meaning of thought and linguistic expression together as a single modification of an “ideal [or psychological] reality.” Hermeneutics fails without that improvement, Kimmerle believes (and believes Schleiermacher came to believe). But the admission marks hermeneutics as blessed or cursed with an ineliminable element of art that no purely methodical *universal science* could overtake.<sup>7</sup>

This theme fixes one of the master issues of the hermeneutic tradition. In fact it is one of the master issues of the entire history of attempting to place correctly the conceptual peculiarities of the human sciences. The essential puzzle is neat enough, elusive though its full significance may be: first, admit the hermeneutic circle; then, is it the case that, in granting that the meaning of the part presupposes and entails the meaning of the whole, we are entitled to infer that there *is* a whole, a totality of language, a context of contexts, an all-encompassing system, within which every provisional part and every provisional whole can be assigned its rightful place? Schleiermacher’s answer is that the process is “infinite,” “unending,” and that we can only “approximate” such a totality. There is none that can be assumed to be in place from the start; and language itself is a human achievement—in the double sense that it is uniquely human and that it is an artifact of human society.

Actually, Schleiermacher is very good on this point, very modern, though we cannot be sure how much he would have us understand by his answer. For example, in the so-called “First Draft of 1809-10,” he says the following: “Grasping the character of a language by means of the reflection of the totality of thinking in that language is possible only in the case of primitive peoples living close to nature. Others can do it only by comparing several languages. One who has lost his philological

innocence must for the most common cases rely on philological science. The task can be completed only by approximation. Since it is difficult for an individual person to penetrate to the unity of words, it must also be difficult for people as a whole. . . . However, even the unity of words is itself historical and develops.”<sup>8</sup> Here, we have the suggestion of an original, possibly universal, totalizable, but distinctly primitive language (matching word and world) that fuses the question of the origin of language and its structural universality—in a way that cannot fail to remind us of the tradition of Condillac that moves (with whatever contestable historical linkage) through Rousseau, Herder, Humboldt, Saussure, Levi-Strauss, and even Chomsky<sup>9</sup>—as well as the glimmer of the larger import of a combined romantic and historicist picture of the creative and opened character of natural language.

It is true that Schleiermacher is not sufficiently explicit here. Schleiermacher does not quite indicate what the boundaries of thought and language are *and*, consequently, he is not entirely explicit about whether thinking is or can be said to be coextensive with language and what that really means. The issue is a uniquely modern one. For it raises the question of the conceptual compatibility of a totalized system of possibilities, a genuinely open-ended history, *and* a genuinely creative imagination. Since Schleiermacher clearly moves steadily in the direction of enhancing the idealist, romantic, and creative aptitudes of “parolists,” the coherence of his entire theory is at stake: in fact, more is at stake—the entire hermeneutic tradition and the very prospects of the human sciences. For the puzzles of all the human sciences rest finally with the reconcilability of there being (1) assignably regular structures of language in virtue of which particular utterances and acts may be correctly interpreted, (2) sufficient openness of structure so that inventive minds can be seen to exceed (and thereby to alter) the apparent strictures of language so far received, and (3) the spontaneous intelligibility of what is thus invented, in terms of extending the would-be structures of received usage.

The balance is intriguing, since it is precisely the analogue of that attempt, within the Enlightenment world, to fuse the universality of language as the medium of thought (preeminently,

of science) and the relativity of divergent historical languages and cultures. These issues come together in the great problem of translation—which, on (what are usually alleged to be) Locke's grounds might not be resolvable, but on Condillac's (following Locke) was and had to be resolved. (The shift confirms as well the rationalist themes that link Locke and Descartes and that were, in the eighteenth century, perceived to link them.) It is of course in the hermeneutic tradition, notably in Schleiermacher, that the "endless" nature of translation is adumbrated and explored. Schleiermacher speaks of it as "approximate"; and it is this theme (infinity or endlessness) that, embraced by Gadamer, is used to repudiate the presumption of romantic hermeneutic methods aspiring (as in Dilthey) to a measure of rigor comparable to positivist presumption.

There appears to be only one way to resolve that puzzle; and Schleiermacher seems, however casually or incipiently, to have been moving in the right direction. On the required argument (once again combining philosophy and history), the species-specific regularities of human biology must afford a sufficiently common ground of feeling, perception, needs and desires, capacity for thought and language and action, such that the historical variety of natural language and culture need not (and apparently does not) exceed the interpretive (or translational) aptitudes of apt speakers both within and among given societies. This means that it is really not necessary to postulate a fully totalized, single, completely structured set of linguistic possibilities for the race in terms of which *all* variations due to historical relativity and individual creativity become at once no more than instantiations of that single synchronic system. That surely would have been contrary to Schleiermacher's romantic tendencies; Schleiermacher himself does not ever seem to have asserted such a totalized picture even in his strongest (earliest and most nearly Enlightenment) emphasis on a universal grammar; and, viewed in the spirit of a large historical anticipation, it suggests the potential extravagance and the empirical uncertainty of both French structuralism and Chomskyan nativism.

To press the point, however, which seems genuinely in accord with Schleiermacher's theme

through all its vicissitudes, is neither to side with extreme relativism (of the sort, for instance, Gadamer worried so much about, as the threatening upshot of Heidegger's existential hermeneutics) or to side with extreme deconstruction (of the sort, for instance, Derrida insists on in his hilarious debunking of structuralism and of Rousseau as a proto-structuralist).<sup>10</sup> The natural adjunct of avoiding any totalism together with insisting on an objective hermeneutic method is the recoverability (along provisional, probabilistic, approximative, self-corrective, and hermeneutically circular lines) of diverse human traditions, genres, styles, and the like. And that is Schleiermacher's way, sympathetic with what Schleiermacher calls "technical" studies of language variation and intuitive "divinatory" studies of the psychological features of particular authors and speakers. In this way, Schleiermacher balances very nicely the societal and the individual, the methodological and the gifted or empathetic, and the objectively general and subjectively variant. In fact, it provides a very suggestive key regarding Schleiermacher's sympathy for the great eighteenth-century passion for the empirical and comparative study of alien languages and cultures—the theme that effectively unites such authors as Rousseau, Herder, Maupertuis, Humboldt, and in our own time (for radically different reasons) Lévi-Strauss and Chomsky. In Schleiermacher (as indeed in most of the eighteenth-century authors committed to a worldly orientation), the comparative method signifies an approximate construction of the universal structures of language corresponding to the unique, species-specific gifts or aptitudes of man. It is *never* understood as the recovery of a universal system already (in some sense) in place throughout man's history.

The important theme in Schleiermacher's hermeneutics rests with its subtle grasp of the puzzles of method. It implies the cognitive *accessibility* of historically divergent texts and individual idiosyncrasy, *not* a totalized system or privileged source for recovering the meanings of contingent texts. This, surely a central eighteenth-century theme, is an essential part of Schleiermacher's unsatisfactory (but altogether suggestive) speculation that children, originally lacking language, produce "both thinking and language" in a way that favorably compares with the "divinatory" power of apt speakers to

understand the inner psychological differences among other apt speakers. "Are we not tempted to say [Schleiermacher inquires] that each child produces both thinking and language originally, and that either each child out of himself by virtue of an inner necessity [say, of the need to communicate] engenders them in a way that coincides with the way it had happened to others or gradually as he becomes capable of a comparative procedure he approximates others."<sup>11</sup> The principal point is that language is acquired, is culturally and individually quite plastic, and yet has a capacity for facilitating universal communication. Schleiermacher clearly does not take language to be innate in that systematic and totalized sense Chomsky has made so fashionable in our own day. It would of course have "solved" the problem of acquisition and of universal translatability at a stroke. But Chomsky's theory is utterly opposed to seventeenth and eighteenth-century theories of the innate *capacity* of reason that precludes determinate grammatical structures, "ideas," concepts, propositions, and the like as innate—in spite of the fact that Chomsky professes to find the sources of his own conception in Cartesian linguistics.<sup>12</sup>

Both Descartes and Locke have actually denied explicitly the innatist and anti-innatist themes Chomsky attributes to them respectively, and to the schools of thought they represent.<sup>13</sup> The fact remains (not to lose track of the main issue) that Schleiermacher never treats the universalism of language as fixed, closed, totalized, innate, or capable of precluding the difficulty of translation; but the condition of its origins does make the prospect of a rational method of understanding and translation possible in spite of obvious difficulties. It is also a reasonable conjecture (though there appears to be no explicit evidence in Schleiermacher's hermeneutic papers) to construe his speculation as a distant cousin—now, hermeneutically disciplined—of the main themes of Condillac's *Essai sur l'origine des connaissances humaines* (1746), which set the problem of the Berlin Academy to which Herder devoted his prize-winning essay (1769), the problem Maupertuis actually set on becoming the first president of the revived Academy at the time Frederick the Great became king of Prussia, the very problem Maupertuis himself discusses in

his *Réflexions sur l'origine des langues et la signification des mots* (1748), apparently inspired by Condillac's *Essai*.<sup>14</sup> The significance of this is that Schleiermacher essentially repeats the prevailing thesis of the tradition that begins with Condillac: that *thought* (in the distinctive sense of propositionally formulable knowledge, not of the intuitive, so-called "practical" know-how of animals) is inseparable from language, that language must have its roots in pre-human animal sources, that it appears exclusively in humans, that it depends essentially on the societal conditions of human life and the drive among humans to communicate, and that the artifactual achievement of language produces the historical diversity of language itself, thereby posing the fundamental (but not insurmountable) problem of translation. That Schleiermacher could not penetrate satisfactorily beyond these now-familiar themes is not surprising: our empirical achievement in this regard has not been significantly improved since his day.

One can only speak here of the "contribution" of Schleiermacher. Obviously, the hermeneutic puzzle was not solved by Schleiermacher: it has not been solved yet. But Schleiermacher manages to collect the strongest and fullest picture of the methodological issue possible in his own day—one in fact very much firmer than the radically antimethodological reflections of those who, like Gadamer, have been rather overwhelmed by the *historicity* of texts and their interpretation. Schleiermacher has hardly even an inkling of a fully radicalized sense of history. Perhaps it is the advantage of his own age—which sought to balance the message of the common nature of man and the implications of the French Revolution. In any case, Schleiermacher provides a conceptual space within which the diversity of history and idiosyncrasy can find a place accessible to translation (to the extent it is) or can be shown to be understandably difficult (or impossible) to translate—though always with its serious theoretical implications, given historical discontinuities that may exceed the power of any "divinatory" talent.

From the point of view of intellectual scruple alone, it cannot be denied that Gadamer plays fast and loose with the regularities that make understanding and translation possible as well

as with the dizzying historicity his own acceptance of Heidegger would have required. This Schleiermacher rather neatly escapes, without ever committing himself to the privileged romantic recovery of original authorial intent he is usually accused of. Gadamer favors the classical tradition (particularly the Greek) as the one reliable set of structured regularities that persists as recognizably one and universally human *through* the vagaries of history.<sup>15</sup> So do the eighteenth-century theorists, of course—but they do so innocently, since they had not yet grasped the radically disorienting relativism implicit in Heidegger's conception of human history.

Gadamer *needs* the classical tradition in order to ensure that rejecting a universally apt hermeneutic *method* will not produce a chaos of human understanding and interpretation. The eighteenth-century theorists did not face such fears, since: (a) they postulate a common human nature, a common capacity for language and investigative reason; and (b) they did not yet understand the extreme possibilities of radical history. Hence, they believed in the full cognitive accessibility of the past and of diverse societies in their own time. Schleiermacher is simply the sensible beneficiary of these two themes—who manages by a supreme effort to bring together the relatively separate traditions of Biblical hermeneutics and Enlightenment speculations about the origin of human language. The positive advantage of *his* thesis is that the contingencies of history cannot be supposed to disable utterly the translational efforts of any present society of interpretive readers. Gadamer cannot hold on to that theme (or to that theme so construed) and will not permit himself to drift into the camp of the extreme deconstructionists (potentially, Heidegger as much as Derrida). *He* saves the day by arbitrarily inventing the assured stability and the universal custodial function of the classical tradition. But, of course, that won't work.

The interesting fact is that the principal themes of the late hermeneutic movement, chiefly indebted to Heidegger and Gadamer—the doctrine of the fusion of horizons (*Horizontverschmelzung*) and the effective preformational, historicized influence of one's distinctive culture on one's own thought (*wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein*; the terms are Gadamer's)—are not really irrecon-

cilable with Schleiermacher's larger conception of hermeneutic method. It is true that Schleiermacher does favor very strongly the recovery of prior intention and historical practice. But the later hermeneutic tradition does not really deny its pertinence: it essentially attenuates the theme in a manner meant to reject any reliance on cognitive foundations and cognitive privilege. Schleiermacher views his project in the same spirit. The only trouble is—it is, frankly, the difference between a late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century thinker and ourselves—that Schleiermacher did not anticipate that the grammatical and psychological regularities *he* took for granted would themselves be construed by critics more radical than Gadamer (by the deconstructionists in particular) as evidence of a deeper cognitive privilege. But that issue has yet to be resolved—even for us; and it is by no means clear that it must be or can coherently be resolved in favor of an utter rejection of methodological discipline, however historically sensitized it may be made to be.

The fact is that the perceived import of the French Revolution is still, in a very real sense, the incompletely digested datum of the meta-theory of the human sciences down to our own day. Schleiermacher's distinction lies in having reconciled the treatment of the hermeneutic question with that somewhat inchoate but increasingly focussed tradition of theorizing, in the only reasonable way possible within the terms of reference of his own day. The truth remains that there is really not that much that, in principle, separates his sense from ours: of the puzzle of uniting the search for the universals of human understanding and the contingencies of human history. It is only that *we*, understandably, are very much more pessimistic about the upshot of any such effort.

<sup>1</sup> Schleiermacher's texts are collected in F.D.E. Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics The Handwritten Manuscripts*, ed. Heinz Kimmerle, trans. James Duke and Jack Forstman (Missoula, 1977).

<sup>2</sup> *Hermeneutics*, §55.

<sup>3</sup> Cited by Kimmerle, "Afterword of 1968," in *Hermeneutics*, p. 234.

<sup>4</sup> Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 2nd ed., trans. Garrett, Barden, and Cumming (New York, 1975), third part.

<sup>5</sup> Heinz Kimmerle, "Editor's Introduction," in *Hermeneutics*.

<sup>6</sup> Cited by Kimmerle, *ibid.*, p. 36.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., pp. 38-40. Cf. MS. 4, pp. 162-64; MS. 5, p. 193, *Hermeneutics*.

<sup>8</sup> "First Draft of 1908-10," in *Hermeneutics*, p. 76.

<sup>9</sup> See Hans Aarsleff, *From Locke to Saussure; Essays on the Study of Language and Intellectual History*. (University of Minnesota Press, 1982), particularly "The Tradition of Condillac: The Problem of the Origin of Language in the Eighteenth Century and the Debate in the Berlin Academy before Herder," "Condillac's Speechless Statue," and "Wilhelm von Humboldt and the Linguistic Thought of the French *Idéologues*." of which all our efforts are the "parts."

<sup>10</sup> See Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans Gayatri Spivak Chakravorty (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976).

<sup>11</sup> "Academy Addresses," p. 193.

<sup>12</sup> See Noam Chomsky, *Cartesian Linguistics* (New York, 1966).

<sup>13</sup> Hans Aarsleff has provided the essential evidence. See Aarsleff, pp. 173-74 in the context of the whole of "The Tradition of Condillac."

<sup>14</sup> The full account is given in Aarsleff

<sup>15</sup> Gadamer, pp. 271-72. This is the key to Gadamer's reading of the hermeneutic circle, of the genuine "whole"